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PENN. STATE POLICE V. SUDERS,
124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004)
FACTS
Nancy Drew Suders worked as a police communications operator for
the McConnellsburg barracks of the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP)
beginning in March 1998.1 While working at PSP, her three supervisors
constantly sexually harassed her.2 In June 1998, one of the supervisors
accused her of taking a missing accident file home with her.3 As a result of
this incident, Suders told PSP's Equal Employment Opportunity Officer,
Virginia Smith-Eliott, that she "might need some help," but "neither woman
followed up on the conversation., 4 Suders again contacted Smith-Eliott on
August 18, 1998, and informed her that she was being harassed and was
afraid.5 Smith-Eliott told Suders to file a complaint but did not indicate
where she could acquire the forms to do so. 6 Suders felt that Smith-Eliott
seemed insensitive and unhelpful.7
Two days later, Suders's supervisors arrested her for theft, and
Suders resigned from the force. 8 Suders took tests she had completed to
satisfy a PSP job requirement from the PSP office.9 She said she believed
that the tests were her property. 10 She concluded that while her employers
told her that she continually failed the test, they never forwarded the tests for
grading.' When Suders returned the tests to the PSP drawer, her hands
turned blue as a result of the theft-detection powder that her employers had
dusted the drawer with to catch her.12  Her employers handcuffed and
questioned her.' 3 PSP never charged her with theft. 
14
In September 2000, Suders sued PSP in federal district court
alleging, inter alia, that while employed at PSP, her employers sexually
harassed her and she was constructively discharged in violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' 5 Although the district court found that
Suders presented sufficient evidence to permit a trier of fact to conclude that
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342 (2004).
2 Id. at 2347.
3 Id. at 2348.
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the supervisors had created a hostile work environment, the district court
held that PSP was not vicariously liable for the supervisors' conduct, and
thus, granted PSP's motion for summary judgment. 16 To reach its decision,
the court relied on the principles enunciated in Faragher v. Boca Raton17 and
Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth.'8 In both cases, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that in the absence of a tangible employment action, 9
the employer could argue that "it exercised reasonable care to prevent or
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise., 20 The district court concluded that Suders did not avail herself of
PSP's internal procedures for reporting harassment as she resigned just two
days after first reporting the harassment.2 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence of a
constructive discharge.22 The court concluded that a constructive discharge
should always be treated as a "tangible employment action," thereby
rendering the Ellerth/Faragher defenses inapplicable.23 On appeal, the issue
was whether the Court of Appeals had correctly held that a constructive
discharge is always a tangible employment action which would eliminate the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defenses.24
16 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2349.
17 Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (establishing an affirmative defense to sexual
harassment charges for employers). The plaintiff, a lifeguard, brought an action against her employer and
two supervisors claiming a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 780. The
plaintiff alleged that the two supervisors created a sexually hostile environment by subjecting female
lifeguards to uninvited touching and lewd comments. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that an
employer may be vicariously liable for the discriminatory behavior of one of its employees, subject to an
affirmative defense which assesses the reasonableness of the employer's attempts to prevent and correct
any sexual harassment and determines whether the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer. Id.
18 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (creating an affirmative defense to
sexual harassment charges for employers in the absence of a tangible employment action). Plaintiff quit
her job as a salesperson after refusing sexual advances from a supervisor. Id. at 748. The plaintiff sued
her employer alleging a violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 749. On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that an employer can be responsible for an employee's sexual harassment of another
employee if the employer knew of the conduct or reasonably should have known, but failed to stop it. Id.
at 759. In the absence of a tangible employment action, the employer has available the affirmative
defense that it had reasonable mechanisms to prevent harassment and the employee failed to take
advantage of these mechanisms. Id. at 765.
19 The Supreme Court indicated that a "tangible employment action" would include a discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment. Id. at 765.
20 Suders, 124 S. Ct. at 2349.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2350.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that constructive discharge is not always a
tangible employment action and, thus, an employer is not necessarily denied
the EllerthIFaragher defenses.25
ANALYSIS
The Court began its analysis with the general assertion that an
26employer may be liable for the actions of its supervisors.6 This concept is
based on agency principles.27 The employer is liable when the agent was
aided in performing the misconduct by the existence of its relationship with
the employer.28 Such liability was the basis for the Court's decisions in
Ellerth and Faragher, in which it held that in the absence of a tangible
employment action, an employer has certain affirmative defenses.29 The
Court found that the absence of a tangible employment action is important
because it is not then obvious that the agency relationship is the driving force
in the commission of the misconduct. 30  Unlike an actual termination, a
constructive discharge 31 is not necessarily affected through an official act of
32the employer company. Considering this, the Court concluded that in the
absence of an official act by an employer, the employer has available the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense that the employee failed to take
advantage of reasonable employer-provided mechanisms to prevent and
rectify sexual harassment in the workplace.33 The Court reasoned that if an
official act does not underlie the constructive discharge, the employer has no
reason to suspect that the resignation is due to a hostile work environment.
34
This uncertainty, both in terms of the role the agency relationship played and
whether the employer had knowledge of the misconduct, justifies allowing
the employer to avail itself of the EllerthIFaragher affirmative defenses.
35
The Court held that the Third Circuit's decision should be overruled
in order to avoid jury confusion.36 By treating a constructive discharge as an
23 Id.
26 Id. at 2352.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 2353.
30 Id.
31 A constructive discharge denotes a situation in which "working conditions become so
intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign." Id. at 2354.
32 Id. at 2355.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 2357.
Id. at 2356.
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actual discharge and thus an official employer act under all circumstances,
the Third Circuit held that a defendant could never assert the
EllerthFaragher affirmative defenses in a constructive discharge claim.
37
However, the Third Circuit would allow the EllerthiFaragher defenses to be
asserted in an "ordinary" hostile work environment claim that involves no
tangible employment action.38 This holding would lead to confusion as the
creation of a hostile work environment is a necessary predicate to a hostile
environment constructive discharge case. 39 Additionally, the Court noted
that the Third Circuit qualified its holding that a constructive discharge itself
constitutes a tangible employment action when it indicated that it an
employer's remedial program and an employee's use of it may be relevant to
a claim of constructive discharge.4° Ironically, these considerations are the
same considerations relevant to the affirmative defense in Ellerth and
Faragher, which the Third Circuit claimed were not applicable. 4'
DISSENTING OPINION
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued the majority defined
"constructive discharge" in a way that does not resemble the definition of an
42actual discharge. He argued that the majority rule allows a plaintiff to
allege a constructive discharge absent any adverse employment action.43
Thus, the majority's definition closely resembles an aggravated case of
sexual harassment or hostile discharge, cases in which an employer is only
liable if found to be negligent. 44 Thomas argued that Suders did not adduce
sufficient evidence of an adverse action taken because of her sex, nor did she
allege that PSP was negligent in monitoring the sexual harassment.45 Thus,
Justice Thomas held that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed, but on different grounds than the majority articulated.
46
CONCLUSION
The Court was concerned with holding strictly liable under Title VII




40 Id. at 2356-2357.
41 Id. at 2357.
42 Id. at 2358.
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engaged in sexual harassment via an official act. The presence of an official
act is important because it indicates that the supervisor acted as the
employer's agent in the misconduct and thus the employer is presumed to be
on notice of the possibility of supervisor misconduct. 47  A constructive
discharge does not necessarily give the employer notice of any supervisor
misconduct; thus, the Court held that if an official act does not underlie the
constructive discharge, the employer can avail itself of the EllerthIFaragher
affirmative defenses.48
On its face, this Court's holding sets good public policy by allowing
employers who may conceivably have no knowledge of their supervisors'
wrongdoing an opportunity to present evidence to that effect in their defense.
It should be relevant that an employer had in place mechanisms to prevent
and rectify sexual harassment and whether the employee took advantage of
these mechanisms. No matter what measures an employer takes, there
always exists the risk that one employee or a supervisor will sexually harass
another employee, but, when an employer is put on notice that such
harassment might be taking place but does not act to remedy it, the employer
should be strictly liable for its employee's actions. While it is important to
discourage sexual harassment and to protect employees from sexual
harassment, neither goal will be served by holding an employer liable for the
harassment committed by a supervisor if the employer has taken substantial
measures to ensure such harassment does not take place and if the employer
has no way of knowing that such harassment is taking place.
However, it should not be accepted dogmatically that an employer is
less blameworthy because he has established a mechanism to deal with
sexual harassment. The Supreme Court created the EllerthiFaragher
defenses to encourage employers to create anti-harassment mechanisms to
effectuate the goal of Title VII-the prevention of workplace
49discrimination. Unless the Supreme Court and lower courts demand more
than a nominal remedial harassment mechanism, the employer or a harassing
supervisor may have available affirmative defenses to which they ought not
to be entitled.5 °
Summary and Analysis Prepared By:
Michael Lestino
47 Id. at 2353, 2355.
48 Id. at 2355.
49 Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative
Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197 (2004).
50 Lawton, supra note 49.
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